Characterizations of the choice functions that select the cores or the externally stable cores induced by an underlying revealed dominance digraph are provided. Relying on such characterizations, the basic order-theoretic structure of the corresponding sets of revealed cores is also analyzed. In particular, it is shown that the poset of all revealed cores ordered by set inclusion is a median meet semilattice: therefore, any pro…le of revealed cores may be aggregated by means of the simple majority rule.
Introduction
The core of a game is the set of its undominated outcomes, with respect to a suitably de…ned dominance irre ‡exive relation, or loopless digraph. Now, consider the ongoing operation of a multi-agent system, e.g. an organization or indeed any decision-making unit whose outputs are aptly modeled as the outcomes of a game. Let us then assume that the set of available options does in fact change at a faster pace than the behavioural attitudes of the relevant players and the latter interact as predicted by the core of that game. It follows that the corresponding choice behaviour of the given interaction system as recorded by its choice function should be constrained in some way by its game-theoretic structure and thus somehow reveal that fact. But then, what are the characteristic '…ngerprints'of such a choice function, namely the testable behavioural predictions of the core as a solution concept? Or more simply, which choice functions de…ned over arbitrary subsets of an 'universal' outcome set may be regarded as revealed cores? Let us call that issue, for ease of reference, the (full domain) core revelation problem.
Apparently, such a problem has never been addressed in its full generality in the extant literature. To be sure, parts of the massive body of literature on 'revealed preference'provide partial answers addressing the case of nonempty cores, i.e. of acyclic revealed dominance digraphs (see e.g. Wilson (1970) , Sen (1971) , Plott (1974) , Suzumura (1983) ). Moreover, there is also some work covering the case of possibly empty sets of undominated outcomes for an arbitrary -i.e. possibly not irre ‡exive-binary relation R, hence putting aside the original game-theoretic interpretation of R as a dominance relation (see e.g. Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995) , and Danilov and Koshevoy (2009) ). But of course the dominance relation of a game in its usual meaning has to be irre ‡exive (no outcome dominates itself), and the core of a game may well be empty, because its revealed dominance digraph may have cycles. Here, we are interested precisely in the general version of the core revelation problem for the full domain, namely in a characterization of all revealed cores as solutions for a certain 'universal'outcome set and all of its subsets, including (locally) empty-valued cores.
A further generalization of the core revelation problem to the case of choice functions with an arbitrary domain (along the lines of Bossert, Suzumura (2010)) is left as a topic for another paper.
The present paper is aimed at …lling this gap in the literature by addressing the general core revelation problem with full domain as formulated above, under several variants of the notion of core. A study of the basic ordertheoretic properties of the corresponding classes of revealed core-solutions as canonically ordered by set-inclusion is also provided: in particular, it is shown that the class of all revealed cores (as opposed to, say, the class of nonempty-valued revealed cores) is a meet sub-semilattice of the lattice of all choice functions, and in fact a median meet semilattice. A remarkable consequence of that fact is that any pro…le of revealed cores is amenable to aggregation by the simple majority rule.
Thus, it turns out that each revealed core embodies a considerable part of standard maximizing choice, while the global structure of (full domain) revealed cores retains the order-theoretic properties of the space of all (full domain) choice functions that is most signi…cant from the point of view of simple majority aggregation.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 includes a presentation of the model and the main characterization results; section 3 provides some basic results concerning the order-theoretic properties of the classes of revealed core-solutions previously characterized; section 4 consists of a few concluding remarks.
Choice functions and revealed cores
Let X be a set denoting the 'universal'outcome set, with cardinality #X 3, and P(X) its power set. It is also assumed for the sake of convenience that X is …nite (but it should be remarked that the bulk of the ensuing analysis is easily lifted with suitable minor adaptations to the case of an in…nite outcome set). A choice function on X (with full domain) is a de ‡ationary operator on P(X) i.e. a function c : P(X) ! P(X) such that c(A) A for any A X (empty choice sets are allowed). A choice function c is proper if c(A) 6 = ? whenever ? 6 = A X. We denote C X the set of all choice functions on X, and C X the subset of all proper choice functions on X. The proper subdomain of c 2 C X -written D c -is the set of all subsets of X with a nonempty-valued choice set i.e. D c = fA X : c(A) 6 = ?g. For any binary relation B X X, and any Y X, B a and B s denote the asymmetric and symmetric components of B, respectively, while B Y = B \ (Y Y ) and B = (X X) n B. Recall that B X X is re ‡exive i¤ xBx for all x 2 X, irre ‡exive i¤ not xBx for all x 2 X, total i¤ xBy or yBx for any x; y 2 X, asymmetric i¤ xBy entails not yBx for any x; y 2 X, transitive i¤ xBy and yBz entail xBz for any x; y; z 2 X, quasi-transitive if B a is transitive, negatively transitive if B is transitive. The transitive closure T (B) is the smallest transitive R B. Moreover, B is strictly acyclic i¤ its transitive closure is irre ‡exive, and a strict partial order i¤ it is both asymmetric and transitive.
Let X X be an irre ‡exive binary relation on X, denoting a suitably de…ned dominance relation: (X; ) is the corresponding dominance digraph (in graph-theoretic parlance, (X; ) is in particular a simple, loopless digraph i.e. a directed graph with at most one arc between any ordered pair of vertices, and with no arc from any vertex to itself). In particular, (X; ) is an
on Y (of course X = ), and (Y; Y ) is the induced dominance subdigraph on Y . Broadly speaking, the core of (Y; Y ) is the set of
Remark 1 It should be emphasized here that any dominance digraph may arise in a natural way from an underlying game in coalitional form and from a related game in strategic form. Indeed, the dominance digraph (X; g ) de…ned by the following rule can be attached in a natural way to any coalitional game g = (N; X; E;
for any x; y 2 X, x; y 2 X, x g y i¤ there exist A X and S N such that x 2 A 2 E(S) and z i y for all i 2 S and z 2 A (see Vannucci (2009) for further details).
Two binary relations R(c), R c induced by a choice function c 2 C X on X and de…ned as follows will play a pivotal role in the ensuing analysis: for any x; y 2 X, xR c y if and only if x 2 c(fx; yg), while xR(c)y if and only if there exists Y X such that x 2 c(Y ) and y 2 Y . A choice function c 2 C X is a revealed core-solution if there exists an irre ‡exive relation X X such that c(Y ) = C(Y; Y ) for any Y X. Similarly, c 2 C X is a revealed a-core-solution (ES core-solution, ES a-coresolution, respectively) if there exists an irre ‡exive relation
X. Then, we also say that c is core-rationalizable (a-core-rationalizable, EScore-rationalizable, ES-a-core-rationalizable respectively) by the dominance digraph (X; ). Clearly, ES (a-)core-solutions are re…nements of (a-)core solutions. Revealed cores will also be used as a generic label to denote all the foregoing choice functions.
Example 2 Notice that digraph (X; ?) is also a dominance digraph, and C(A; ? A ) = C a (A; ? A ) = A for any A X (hence it is also -triviallyexternally stable). Therefore, the identity operator c id : P(X) ! P(X) is a revealed core-solution (a-core-solution, ES core-solution).
Example 3 By way of contrast, take ? G X and consider the dichotomic choice function c G : P(X) ! P(X) as de…ned by the 'strict' satis…cing rule c G (A) = A \ G for any A X. It is easily checked that c G is not a revealed core: to see this, take any x 2 X n G. Then, c G (fxg) = ? while for any dominance digraph (X; ) and any x 2 X, it cannot be the case that x x hence C(fxg ; fxg ) = C a (fxg ; fxg ) = fxg.
Example 4 Next, take again ? G X and consider the nonempty valued dichotomic choice function c G + : P(X) ! P(X) as de…ned by the 'lax' satis…cing rule c
The main objective of this article is precisely to provide a characterization of all revealed cores in C X , and study their basic order-theoretic structure.
To begin with, let us consider two requirements concerning local existence of nonempty choice sets. It is easily checked that ND is satis…ed by all revealed cores, while 2-PR is only violated by core solutions when the underlying dominance digraph is not asymmetric. A stronger property that obviously entails both ND and 2-PR is Properness (PR): c(A) 6 = ? for any nonempty A X:
The following properties of a choice function c 2 C X play a prominent role, under various labels, in the extant literature: Property C is a contraction-consistency condition for choice sets in that it requires that any outcome chosen out of a certain set should also be chosen out of any subset of the former: essentially, it says that any good reason to choose a certain option out of a given menu should retain its strenght in every submenu of the former containing that option.
Conversely, property CO (also variously denoted as or Generalized Condorcet-consistency) is an expansion-consistency condition for choice sets, requiring that an outcome chosen out of a certain set and of a second one should also be chosen out of the larger set given by the union of those two sets: it says that any good reason to choose a certain option out of two given menus should retain its strenght in the larger menu obtained by merging those two menus.
Property SS is also an expansion-consistency requirement for choice sets: it rules out the possibility that the choice set of a certain menu be nonempty and strictly included in the choice sets of a smaller menu.
We are now ready to prove the main results of this paper. Let us start from the following simple Claim 5 Let R X X be any (binary) relation on X, and de…ne R X X by the following rule: for any x; y 2 X, x R y i¤ not yRx. Then, (i) R = R; (ii) for any Y X, max R Y = x 2 Y : not y R x for all y 2 X , and max R Y = fx 2 Y : not yRx for all y 2 Xg; (iii) R is re ‡exive i¤ R is irre ‡exive, and irre ‡exive i¤ R is re ‡exive; (iv) R is total i¤ R is asymmetric, and asymmetric i¤ R is total; (v) R is quasi-transitive i¤ R is quasi-transitive.
Proof. (i) For any x; y 2 X, by de…nition x R y i¤ not y R x i¤ not (not xRy) i¤ xRy:
(ii) Let x 2 Y , and xRy for all y 2 Y : then, by de…nition, not y R x for all y 2 Y , and conversely if not y R x for all y 2 Y then not (not xRy) i.e. xRy for all y 2 Y . Similarly, x 2 Y and not yRx for all y 2 Y : then by de…nition x R y for all y 2 Y , and conversely. (iii) Indeed, by de…nition for any x 2 X, not
R is asymmetric: then, for any x; y 2 X; it may be the case that not y R x or not x R y (or both). Now, if not y R x then xRy and if not x R y then yRx, therefore R is total. Conversely, suppose R is total. If xRy then not( not xRy) hence not( y R x) and similarly yRx entails not( x R y), thus in any case R is asymmetric. Similarly, R is asymmetric i¤ for any x; y 2 X it cannot be the case that xRy and yRx, i.e. by de…nition i¤ it is not the case that not y R x and not x R y, namely R is total. (v) Suppose that R is quasi-transitive, and that both x( R ) a y and y( R ) a z. Then, by de…nition (not yRx and xRy), and ( not zRy and yRz ) i.e. xR a y and yR a z, hence xR a z. Therefore, xRz and not zRx i.e. not z R x and x R z, namely x( R ) a z. Conversely, suppose that R is quasi-transitive, and that both xR a y and yR a z. Then, by de…nition (xRy and not yRx), and (yRz and not zRy) i.e. by de…nition (not y R x and x R y) and (not z R y and
Therefore, x R z and not z R x i.e. not zRx and xRz, namely xR a z.
Remark 6
The content of the previous Claim is certainly not unknown, but I have been unable to …nd a reference in print to it except for the statement of point (iv) in Monjardet (2007) , while Plott (1974) , Theorem 8, only includes a specialized version of the same point.
The following Theorem extends and/or supplements some previous characterization results for revealed cores due to Wilson (1970) and Sen (1971) . (ii)()(iii) (see Wilson (1970) Remark 8 Notice that the equivalence between statements (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 7 above should in fact be credited to Wilson(1970) because it is strictly related (indeed, essentially equivalent) to Theorem 3 of Wilson (1970) , though the latter concerns nonempty core-solutions over an arbitrary domain D P(X) r f?g hence, strictly speaking, is a statement about a class of partial proper choice functions. On the other hand, Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995) have a similar result (see their Theorem 2.5 ) namely a characterization by the conjunction of C and CO of the choice functions selecting the outcomes 'permitted' by all outcomes -or 'not prohibited' by any outcomeaccording to an arbitrary 'permission'or 'prohibition'binary relation.
Remark 9
The foregoing characterization result is tight. To check that, consider the following examples.
(1) Let c I 2 C X be de…ned as follows: for any A X, c
where L is a linear order on X and x is its bottom element. Clearly, c I violates ND, but satis…es C and CO; (2) Let X = fx; y; zg, and c II 2 C X be de…ned as follows: c II (fhg) = fhg for any h 2 X, c II (fx; yg) = fxg, c II (fy; zg) = fyg, c II (fx; zg) = fzg, and c II (X) = X. It is immediately checked that c III satis…es ND and CO, but violates C since e.g. y 2 c II (X) \ fx; yg but y = 2 c II (fx; yg); (3) Let c III 2 C X be de…ned as follows: for any A X, c
otherwise, where L is a linear order on X. It is easily seen that c III satis…es ND and C, but violates CO.
Next, we have a similar characterization result for revealed a-cores which is also an extension to the general case of possibly non-proper choice functions of previous results as discussed below (see Remark 13). 
For any x 2 X, not x fxg x i.e not x x by irre ‡exivity of whence by de…nition c(fxg) = C a (fxg ; fxg ) = C(fxg ; fxg ) = fxg and ND is therefore satis…ed by c. Furthermore, for any x; y 2 X, fx;yg f(x; y); (y; x)g hence a fx;yg 2 f?; f(x; y)g ; f(y; x)gg. If a fx;yg = ? then C a (fx; yg ; fx;yg ) = fx; yg, otherwise C a (fx; yg ; fx;yg ) = fxg or C a (fx; yg ; fx;yg ) = fyg, respectively, hence in any case c(fx; yg) = C a (fx; yg ; fx;yg ) 6 = ? thus c satis…es 2-PR. Also, for any Y; Z X such that Y Z, and any
and CO is satis…ed by c.
(iii)()(iv): See the proof of Theorem 7 above.
Remark 11
The foregoing characterization result is also tight. To see this, consider the following examples.
(1) Let c I 2 C X as de…ned above (see Remark 9) . Clearly, c I violates ND, but satis…es 2-PR, C and CO;
(2) Let c II 2 C X be de…ned as follows: c II (fxg) = fxg for any x 2 X, and c II (A) = ? for any A X such that #A 2. It is easily checked that c II does indeed satisfy ND, C and CO, but clearly violates 2-PR; (3) Let X = fx; y; zg, and c II 2 C X as de…ned above (see Remark 9) . It is immediately checked that c II satis…es ND, 2-PR, and CO, but violates C; (4) Let c III 2 C X as de…ned above (see Remark 9) . It is easily seen that c III satis…es ND, 2-PR and C, but violates CO.
Corollary 12 (see also Sen (1971) Remark 13 Actually, it is well-known that a proper c satis…es both C and CO if and only if there exists a binary relation R on X such that c(Y ) = max R Y = fy 2 Y : yRz for all z 2 Y g for each Y X and, moreover, R = R(c) = R c as de…ned above -indeed, R(c) = R c for any choice function that satis…es C (see e.g. Sen (1971) , Suzumura (1983) ). Also notice that the equivalence between (ii) and (iii) is due to Plott (1974) . Thus, Corollary 12 is -essentially-a restatement of the Sen-Plott-Suzumura characterization of revealed 'rational' (proper) choice functions or, equivalently, revealed nonempty core solutions.
Let us now turn to characterizations of revealed externally stable coresolutions. Since externally stable cores (of nonempty sets) are nonempty the corresponding choice functions are proper: thus, given the traditional focus on proper choice functions, this subclass of revealed cores is the most widely studied, and best known (thanks again to Wilson (1970) and Suzumura (1983)). Therefore, for the sake of convenience, we collect in the following Theorem a few notable characterizations of revealed externally stable cores (only some of them are already known and available in print, namely those recorded in Suzumura(1983) as explicitly mentioned in the proof below). X. But of course PR entails that c(fx; yg) = max R fx;yg 6 = ? for any x; y 2 X, hence R is total as well.
(ii)=)(i) (Suzumura (1983) ): See again Suzumura (1983), Theorems 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7.
(ii)()(iii): Let be R X X quasi-transitive and such that c(Y ) = max R Y 6 = ? for any nonempty Y X. Of course, PR entails that in particular c(fx; yg) = max R fx;yg 6 = ? for any x; y 2 X, hence R is total as well. The reverse implication is trivial.
(iii)()(v): Let R X X be total and quasi-transitive, and x; y; z 2 X such that not xRy and not yRz. Hence, yRx and zRy since R is total. Therefore, by de…nition, yR a x and zR a y. By quasi-transitivity, it follows that zR a x, whence in particular not xRz i.e. R is negatively transitive. Moreover, totality implies re ‡exivity of R. Conversely, let R X X be re ‡exive and negatively transitive. Suppose there exist x; y 2 X such that not xRy and not yRx: then, by negative transitivity, not xRx, a contradiction since R is re ‡exive. Thus, R is also total. Moreover, let xR a y and yR a z. Then, in particular, not yRx and not zRy. It follows that, by negative transitivity, not zRx whence, by totality, xRz. Thus, xR a z i.e. R is quasi-transitive as well.
(v)()(vi): Let R X X be a negatively transitive relation such that c(Y ) = max R Y 6 = ? for any nonempty Y X. Then in particular, c(fxg) = max R fxg 6 = ? for any x 2 X, hence R is re ‡exive as well. The reverse implication is trivial. X. Again, irre ‡exivity and transitivity imply asymmetry of , which is therefore a strict partial order. The reverse implication is trivial.
Remark 15
Observe that the characterization result of revealed externally stable cores in terms of properties of choice functions included in Theorem 14 is also tight. To see this, consider the following examples.
(1) Let c I 2 C X as de…ned above (see Remark 9) . Clearly, c I violates PR,but satis…es C, CO and SS;
(2) Let X = fx; y; zg, and c II 2 C X as de…ned above (see Remark 9) . It is immediately checked that c II satis…es PR,CO and SS, but violates C; (3) Let X = fx; y; zg, and c IV 2 C X such that c IV (fug) = fug for any u 2 X, c IV (fx; yg) = fx; yg, c IV (fy; zg) = fy; zg, c IV (fx; zg) = fx; zg and c IV (fx; y; zg) = fx; yg. Clearly, c IV satis…es PR, C and SS. However, c IV fails to satisfy CO since z 2 (c IV (fx; zg)\ c IV (fy; zg)) r c IV (fx; y; zg); (4) Let X = fx; y; zg, and c V 2 C X such that c V (fug) = fug for any u 2 X, c V (fx; yg) = fxg, c V (fy; zg) = fyg, c V (fx; zg) = fx; zg and c V (fx; y; zg) = fxg. Clearly, c V satis…es PR, C and CO but fails to satisfy SS since ? 6 = c V (fx; y; zg) c V (fx; zg) .
Remark 16 Notice again that Theorem 14 above is essentially a re…nement of well-known results due to Suzumura (see e.g. Suzumura (1983) , Theorems 2.8 and 2.10) and Plott (1974) , whose Theorems 3, 4, and 7 amount essentially to the equivalence between statements (iii), (iv) and (vii). It should also be mentioned here that the conjunction of C and SS turns out to be equivalent (see e.g. Suzumura (1983) ) to another well-known and widely used property, namely Path Independence (PI): for any A;
B X, c(A [ B) = c(c(A) [ c(B))
Thus, the equivalent statements of Theorem 14 are also equivalent to the statement 'c 2 C X satis…es PR, PI and CO'.
It should be remarked that the characterizations provided above are in general quite straightforward extensions to arbitrary choice functions (with full domain) of previously known results concerning proper choice functions (with full domain). Indeed, the gist of the results o¤ered in the present section may be summarized as follows:
(i) remarkably, the characterizations of general revealed cores and a-cores considered here consist of the very same properties used to characterize their nonempty-valued counterparts as supplemented with very mild-looking local nonemptiness requirements for choice sets of singleton and two-valued subsets, respectively;
(ii) the exact correspondence between revealed core-solutions and maximizing 'rational' choice functions is con…rmed to hold within the general space of arbitrary choice functions: the alleged extra-generality of the latter subclass that has sometimes been alluded to in the literature (as e.g. in Suzumura (1983) , p.21) does not materialize within the space of (total) choice functions and is therefore strictly con…ned to the realm of partial choice functions; (iii) …nally, and most notably, the class of general revealed cores turns out to inherit some of the supplementary order-theoretic structure enjoyed by its larger ambient space as compared to the smaller and less regular space of proper choice functions: that is precisely the topic of the next section.
Posets and semilattices of revealed cores
Let us now turn to a global description of the order-theoretic structure of the class of all revealed core-solutions (a-core-solutions, nonempty-valued coresolutions, externally stable core-solutions, respectively).
A partially ordered set or poset is a pair P = (P; 6) where P is a set and 6 is a re ‡exive, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation on P (i.e. for any x 2 P , x 6 x and for any x; y; z 2 P , x 6 z whenever x 6 y and y 6 z, and x = y whenever x 6 y and y 6 z). For any x 2 P we posit (x] = fy 2 P : y 6 xg. A coatom of a poset P = (P; 6) with a top element or maximum 1 P is any j 2 P which is covered by 1 P -written j l 1 P -i.e. j < 1 P and l = j for any l 2 P such that j 6 l < 1 P . The set of all coatoms of P is denoted A P . Dually, an atom of P is any j 2 P which is an upper cover of 0 P -written 0 P l j-i.e. 0 P < j and l = j for any l 2 P such that 0 P < l 6 j. The set of all atoms of P is denoted A P .
A poset P = (P; 6) is a meet semilattice (join semilattice, respectively) if for any x; y 2 P the 6-greatest lower bound x^y (the 6-least upper bound x _ y, respectively) of fx; yg does exist. Moreover, P is a lattice if it is both a meet semilattice and a join semilattice.
A lattice P = (P; 6) is bounded if there exist both a bottom element 0 P and a top element 1 P (hence in particular a …nite lattice is also bounded), distributive i¤ x^(y _ z) = (x^y) _ (x^z) for any x; y; z 2 P , complemented if it is bounded and for any x 2 P there exists x 0 2 P such that x _ x 0 = 1 P and x^x 0 = 0 P , and Boolean i¤ it is both distributive and complemented. A meet semilattice P = (P; 6) is lower distributive if ((x] ; 6 (x] ) is a distributive lattice for any x 2 P , and has the coronation (or join-Kelly) property if -for any x; y; z 2 P -((x _ y) _ z) exists in P whenever x _ y; x _ z and y _ z also exist. A meet semilattice is median if it is lower distributive and has the coronation property.
The set C X of all choice functions on X can be endowed in a natural way with the point-wise set inclusion partial order 6 by positing, for any c; c 0 2 C X , c 6 c 0 i¤ c(A) c 0 (A) for each A X. Clearly, the identity operator c id is its top element, and the constant empty-valued choice function c ? its bottom element. It is well-known, and easily checked, that (C X ; 6) is in fact a Boolean lattice with join _ = [ (i.e. set-union) and meet^= \ (i.e. set-intersection), both de…ned in the obvious component-wise manner: see e.g. Monjardet, Raderanirina (2004) .
For any x; y 2 X such that x 6 = y, c + xy 2 C X and c xy 2 C X are de…ned as follows: for all A X, c + xy (A) = A r fyg if fx; yg A, and c + xy (A) = A otherwise, and c xy (fzg) = fzg for all z 2 X, c xy (fx; yg) = fyg, and c xy (A) = ? for all A X such that A 6 = fx; yg and #A 6 = 1. Moreover, C + = c + xy : x; y 2 X; x 6 = y , and C = c xy : x; y 2 X; x 6 = y . The minimum ND choice function c [1] is de…ned by the following rule: for any x 2 X; c [1] (fxg) = fxg, and c [1] (Y ) = ? for any Y X such that #Y 6 = 1.
Now, let C X C X denote the set of all revealed core-solutions on X, C a X C X the set of all revealed asymmetric core-solutions, C X = C X \ C X the set of all revealed nonempty-valued core-solutions, and C es X the set of all revealed externally stable core-solutions on X, respectively). We also denote with a slight abuse of notation (C X ; 6), (C a X ; 6), (C X ; 6) and (C es X ; 6) the corresponding subposets of (C X ; 6) (where 6 denotes 6 \(C X C X ),
We have the following
Theorem 17
The poset (C X ; 6) of revealed core-solutions is a sub-meetsemilattice of (C X ; 6) with c id itself as its top element, but not a sub-joinsemilattice of (C X ; 6). It also satis…es the coronation property hence it is a median meet semilattice. The bottom element of (C X ; 6) is the minimum ND choice function c [1] . Moreover, the set of coatoms of (C X ; 6) is C + , and the set of its atoms is C .
Proof. Let c; c 0 2 C X , and consider c \ c 0 . Clearly, for any x 2 X, (c \ c 0 )(fxg) = c(fxg) \ c 0 (fxg) = fxg since c and c 0 satisfy ND: hence c \ c 0 does also satisfy ND.
Moreover, for any A B X, since c and c 0 both satisfy C, (c \ c
0 satis…es C. Finally, since c and c 0 satisfy CO, for any A; B X,
and CO also holds for c \ c 0 . It follows that, by Theorem 7 above, c \ c 0 2 C X , whence (C X ; 6) is a sub-meet-semilattice of (C X ; 6): in particular, it follows that (C X c 2 ) [ c 3 does also satisfy CO. In order to check this last point, consider any A; B X, and
By de…nition, it follows that x 2 c i (A) \ c j (B) for some i; j = 1; 2; 3. Hence, in particular, it also follows that x 2 (c i [ c j )(A) \ (c i [ c j )(B) for some i; j = 1; 2; 3. Now, by hypothesis,
thus, (C X ; 6) has the join-Kelly property and is therefore a median meet-semilattice as claimed.
It is easily checked that c id , the top element of (C X ; 6), does also satisfy ND, C and CO hence as observed above c 2 C X (see Example 2) . Now, consider c [1] as de…ned above: it satis…es ND, by de…nition, and, being nonempty-valued precisely on singletons, it trivially satis…es C and CO as well. Thus, c [1] 2 C X . On the other hand, for any c 2 C X , c must satisfy ND, hence c [1] 6 c. Conversely, let c be a coatom of (C X ; 6) and suppose c = 2 C + . Then, for any pair of distinct x; y 2 X, neither c (A [ B) and CO is also satis…ed by c xy . Next, observe that c xy (A) = c [1] (A) for any A 6 = fx; yg, and c xy (fx; yg) = fxg while c [1] (fx; yg) = ?. Thus, for any c 2 C X (indeed, for any c 2 C X ) if c [1] 6 c 6 c xy then either c = c [1] or c = c xy . Conversely, assume that c is an atom of (C X ; 6) and c = 2 C . Then, by de…nition of C , c(A) = ? for any A such that #A = 2, and there exists B X such that #B 3 and c(B) 6 = ?. It follows that, for any x 2 c(B) and any y 2 B r fxg, c(B) \ fx; yg * ? = c(fx; yg), therefore violating C, a contradiction by Theorem 7.
To check that (C X ; 6) is not a sub-join-semilattice of (C X ; 6), just consider without loss of generality X = fx; y; zg, R = f(x; x); (y; y); (z; z); (y; x); (y; z); (x; z)g and Remark 18 Notice that …niteness of X has been used in the proof above in order to show that the set of coatoms of (C X ; 6) is contained in C + . The latter statement clearly holds for an in…nite X as well provided CO is replaced with the following stronger version of 'Concordance' CO*: for any family fA i g i2I of subsets of X,
Remark 19 Since (C X ; 6) is a semilattice with a top element (and indeed a …nite one, under …niteness of X), it follows that it is also a lattice with meet= \ and join of a pair given by the meet of the (nonempty) set of upper bounds of that pair (see e.g. Davey, Priestley (1990)), which is however not a sublattice of (C X ; 6).
Thus, the poset of revealed core-solutions enjoys the remarkably regular structure of a median meet-semilattice. Notice that an important consequence of that fact is the following: any pro…le of revealed cores admits medians and the latter coincide with the simple majority consensus revealed core if the pro…le consists of an odd list of revealed cores. Therefore, in case several revealed cores are to be considered for aggregation, due perhaps to locally missing or unreliable data and/or plurality of information sources, an amalgamation process by means of the simple majority aggregation rule is available (see e.g. Monjardet, Raderanirina (2004) for some results on choice aggregation rules in the same vein).
The posets of revealed a-core-solutions, nonempty-valued core-solutions, and externally stable core-solutions are considerably less regular, as recorded by the following results, namely Theorem 20 The poset (C a X ; 6) of revealed a-core-solutions has a top element, c id , and C + is the set of its coatoms, but it is neither a sub-meetsemilattice nor a sub-join-semilattice of (C X ; 6). The minimal elements of (C Proof. To check that c id is indeed the top element of (C a X ; 6) it is only to be observed -in view of Theorem 7-that c id does in fact also satisfy 2-PR. Similarly -in view of Theorem 7 and of the proof of Theorem 17 provided above-to see that C + is the set of coatoms of (C a X ; 6) it is only to be checked that any c + xy 2 C + does also satisfy 2-PR (which is clearly the case, by de…nition).
The proof of Theorem 17 already establishes that (C a X ; 6) is not a subjoin-semilattice of (C X ; 6) since, as it is easily checked, c I and c II as de…ned there do belong to C a X . Next, consider c III and c IV de…ned as follows: assume without loss of generality X = fx; y; zg, and take III = f(x; y); (x; z); (y; z)g, IV = f(x; y); (x; z); (z; y)g (notice that both (X; III ) and (X; IV ) are asymmetric digraphs); then, for any A X, posit c III (A) = C(A; Therefore, c III \ c IV violates 2-PR hence by Theorem 7 c
is not a sub-meet-semilattice of (C X ; 6). The last statement about minimal elements of (C a X ; 6) is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 10.
Theorem 21
The poset (C X ; 6) of nonempty-valued core-solutions has a top element, c id , and C + is the set of its coatoms, but it is neither a sub-meetsemilattice nor a sub-join-semilattice of (C X ; 6). The minimal elements of (C a X ; 6) are the single-valued choice functions that satisfy C and CO.
Proof. First, notice that by de…nition c id is proper, hence c id 2 C X since as previously shown it is a core-solution. Also, it is immediately checked that, by de…nition, any c + xy is proper. Therefore, the proof of Theorem 17 also establishes that C + is the set of coatoms of (C X ; 6). In the same vein, it is immediately checked that c I ; c II ; c III ; c IV -as de…ned above in the proofs of the two previous Theorems-are also proper. It follows, by those proofs, that (C X ; 6) is neither a sub-meet-semilattice nor a sub-join-semilattice of (C X ; 6 ). The …nal statement about minimal elements of (C X ; 6) is an immediate consequence of Corollary 12.
Theorem 22
The poset (C es X ; 6) of revealed externally stable core-solutions, has a top element, c id , and C + is the set of its coatoms, but it is neither a sub-meet-semilattice nor a sub-join-semilattice of (C X ; 6). The minimal elements of (C a X ; 6) are the single-valued choice functions that satisfy C, CO and SS.
Proof. Observe that for any A B X, if c id (B) c id (A) then of course B A i.e. B = A whence c id (A) = c id (B) and SS is clearly satis…ed by c id . In view of Theorem 14, this establishes that c id is also the top element of (C es X ; 6). Also, it is immediately checked that any c + xy does in fact satisfy SS. Therefore, the proof of Theorem 17 also establishes that C + is the set of coatoms of (C es X ; 6). Finally, it is immediately checked by direct inspection that c I ; c II ; c III ; c IV -as de…ned above in the proofs of Theorems 19 and 20-do also (trivially) satisfy SS. It follows, by the very same proofs, that (C es X ; 6) is neither a submeet-semilattice nor a sub-join-semilattice of (C X ; 6). The …nal statement about minimal elements of (C es X ; 6) is an immediate consequence of Theorem 14.
Thus, while only the poset of revealed core-solutions is a (meet) subsemilattice of (C X ; 6) all the posets of revealed cores de…ned above share their top element and set of coatoms.
Concluding remarks
Choice functions with full domain which may be regarded as core-solutions or externally stable core solutions of an underlying dominance digraph (X; ) have been characterized both in the general case and for asymmetric dominance digraphs. Both characterizations combine a version of the usual mix of contraction consistency and expansion consistency conditions which is required for the special case of proper i.e. nonempty-valued choice functions with a suitable local nonemptiness requirement for choice sets. The characterizations provided above have also been shown to be helpful for a simple analysis of the basic order-theoretic structure of revealed cores. In particular, as mentioned in the Introduction, every revealed core embodies a considerable part of the structure of standard maximizing choice functions, while the global structure of (full domain) revealed cores retains precisely the median semi-latticial properties of the space of all (full domain) choice functions that are most signi…cant from the point of view of simple majority aggregation. The latter property, however, is not shared by asymmetric or externally stable revealed cores.
